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FIELD GROUP making it much more difficult than in other realms, they still see the skill as a key to victory over an opponent.
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Foresight (military) is the process of cognition of possible changes in the area of military affairs, the determination of the perspectives of its future development. The basis of the science of foresight is knowledge of the objective laws of war, the dialectical-materialist analysis ,f events transpiring in a given con-cre-te-historical coniet.xt.2 
I
The contemporary period of military construction is characterized by the unprecedented intensity of the renewal of the means of war, the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons and equipment, by searches for such forms and means of strategic, operational and tactical action, which have never be employed by a single army of the world. I New means of the conduct of military actions, new ways of perfecting the organization structure of the armed forces, methods of their combat preparation and raising their combat readiness must be found and theoretically substantiated before they can become the property of military praxis. All this leads to as a sharp rise of the role of military science, which has become the most important factor of the combat might of the armed forces, and scientific troop control is the decisive condition for the achievement of victory.3
The relationship between military science and foresight is explicit, for, as these authors emphasize, "In its essence, military science is the science of future war." I. E. Shavrov and M. I. Galkin, eds., metodologiia voennonauchnogo poznaniia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), 3-4. 4 Ibid., 64.
I"
are filtered and analyzed.
5
The most critical element of the ideology remains its commitment to change the world. For the adherents, it is not enough to understand trends; one must struggle to shift them in favor of socialism. Such basic concepts as "correlation of forces" carry with them this notion of dynamism, change, and the requirement to direct those processes.
The Marxist-Leninist approach to systems analysis is quite explicit in its critique of bourgeois or Western applications of the same method without a coherent, conscious ideological position:
One of the basic deficiencies of all variants of bourgeois system theories . . . , especially those based on general systems theory, it is said, is that they cannot explain changes in social systems, where intersocietal or international; they cannot point out a basic factor that motivates the changes and they cannot discover the mechanism of the changes. 6
There are several key features which differentiate Soviet and Western approaches to foresight. As the above quote suggests, the first one is the central and conscious role of ideology in shaping the Soviet vision of the future. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist Ideology tolerates no contradiction between objectivity and partisanship (partiinost' ).
Indeed, it proclaims that only a dec laration of parti.saihi t the uause of socialism and the working class will guarantee the commander must constantly confront the vexing problem of inadequate information about the enemy, his forces, capabilities, and intentions. The "laws" of dialectical materialism do not negate these problems but, rather provide a method for dealing with uncertainties.
In a struggle with an adversary who I approaches foresight strictly on an intuitive basis, these laws P.
are supposed to provide a relative advantage in application. The application of the laws are founded upon concrete historical " I analysis and are akin to the etudes [etiudy] of a chess master, S who uses such exercises to sharpen his ability to :ee five and more moves in advance in order to link together his opening moves, middle, and end game into a complete whole. "
The first of the laws of dialectical materialism is the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, which characterizes the very causes of development.
In military affairs this law finds its expression in the constant tension and mutual interaction o 10 Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar' , (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), 585.
Dictionary defines t tutIHC as study or a piec'e of music for the practice of a point of technique. In Russian et ud (etude) applies to both music and chess. Thus, Triandafillov gave his essay on tactical aspects of the Perekop-Chongar Operation of 1920 the subtitle of takticheskii etiud [tactical study] thereby making the link between chess and foresight. See: V. Triandafillov, "Perkopskaia operatsiia, (takticheskii etiud)," A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, and R. P. Eileman, eds., Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918 -1921 three volumes (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1928 -1930 , I., 339-357. Eideman, explored the relationship between guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare as a burning issues of military theory:
Partisan warfare during the Civil War often assumed a completely independent significance. One can count on the fact that warfare of such a type in future European class wars and in the national-liberation wars of the nations of the East will become the perfect fellowtraveler of regular warfare. Because of this one of the immediate tasks for theoretical work of our militaryscientific theory is: the study of the nature of modern "partisan warfare" and the establishment of a forecast for the future.'
Konoplev, Nauchnoe il_redvidenie v voennom dele, 68-70.
13 A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamanev, M. N. Tukhachevsky, and R. I. Eideman, eds., Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918 Grazhdanskaia voina, -1921 Operativostrategicheskii ocherk boevykh destvii Krasnoi armii, (Mosco :. Gosizdat, Otdel Voennoi Literatury, 1928 -1930 , 18. This did not remain idle intellectual speculation, but during the 1930s was closely tied to the study of the local wars of the pet'iud, including the Italo-Ethiopian War, Spanish Civil 'oa-anzd tht! Sino-Japanese War. Thus, during tile S ino-Japamse 'Var, in w, j Soviet officers served as advisors to the Chinese o'urc,es, th}, application of guerrilla tactics by the 8th Routd Army of the Chinese Communist Party, merited serious attention.
In 1939, N. Argunov published an article in which he outlined the deve olment, of partisan warfare, addressed its impact on the Sino-Japanese conflict, and called attention to the ten basic rules of partisan tactics which had been worked out on the basis of the 8th Route Army's experience.
See: N. --, ,-, , ,--, '.. " ,',',., "-,' '_.',,', ',-', , ' '', '. ';','-'-. ''-' . , , _ " '. '., ''-'',''.'','.',''2. '. Only mass production and tactical innovation could endow such "leaps" with operational impact. In the 1920s, A. A. Svechin, the first Soviet author to address the problem of strategy in a comprehensive fashion, distinguished between technological surprise, which was a near impossibility to achieve, and the critical struggle for the technological initiative. Soviet military science has discerned all these new phenomena of armed struggle. It has defined the essence of the deeply revolutionary processes, which are taking place in military affairs; it has researched and evaluated the conditions under which they inevitably appear.
As a result, it has been able to give a coherent, scientifically-based concept of the character of modern war, which is, as opposed to what happened in the past, based not so much on the experience of past wars, as on scientific foresight and a forecast of a possible future.26 ',J.
Explicit in Major General
Kozlov's analysis of the dominant combat arms in a "nuclear-rocket war," was a vision of future armed conflict which either negated the significance of past combat experience or rendered it largely irrelevant under the new conditions. 
R16VV
have looked to mathematical modeling to assist them in weapons I development, force structuring and the perfection of the means and methods of armed struggle. The authors made three related points: first, they I noted the long lead time required for the research and development of modern weapons systems, which they estimated at 10-15 years.
Second, they called attention to the relatively I short time span over which a new weapons system had its optimal effectiveness, which they estimated at 5-7 years.
Third, the authors asserted that forecasting in the strategic realmn had to I take into account "military, economic, scientific, technical, moral, and political factors, the stability of a coalition, the relationship of world political forces, the geographic positions I of the sides, the degree of vulnerability among the states and their armed forces." 3
In the realm of weapons development Soviet authors have paid particular attention to two crucial methodological approaches.
The first prescribes the examination of any weapon within its systemic context. This approach can be seen at work in
32
. E. Shavrov and >. A. Galkin, eds., Metodologiia voenno-nauchnogo poznaniia, 372-397. In his concluding remarks on the era of the scientific-technical revolution, Kir'ian left the impression that the very pace of innovation had created another on-going revolution in military affairs, far deeper in its impact and long-term potential than that associated with nuclear-rocket weapons.
He observed:
The scientific-technical revolution has sharply increased the pace of material-technical equipping and rearming of the Soviet Army and Navy.
In the course of the last 10-15 years two-three generations of missiles have been replaced; a significant part of the park of aircraft, submarines, surface ships, artillery, tanks, rifle and other arms, combat and special equipment have been renewed.
A fifth generation of computers has been adopted. 
